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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
EFFECT OF CHILD CARE SUBSIDIES ON PRICE AND QUALITY OF CARE
FOR LOW-INCOME FAMILIES
by
Sudhersena Alalasundaram
Florida International University, 1997
Professor Ann Dryden Witte, Major Professor (Co-Chairperson)
Professor James Carroll, Major Professor (Co-Chairperson)
This dissertation examines the effect of regulations, resource and referral
agencies, and subsidies on price and quality of care in child care centers. This research
is based on a carefully developed conceptual framework that incorporates the factors
affecting the demand and supply of child care. The first step in developing this
framework is sketching out the structural equations. The structural equations help us
understand the underlying behavior of individuals and firms making a decision. The
exogenous variables are vector of attributes relating to family characteristics, child
characteristics, regulations, subsidy, community characteristics and prices of inputs.
Based on the structural equations, reduced form equations are estimated to find the effect
of each of the exogenous variables on each of the endogenous variables. Reduced form
equations help us answer public policy questions. The sample for this study is from the
1990 Profile of Child Care Settings (PCCS) data in which 2,089 center based programs
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were interviewed.
Child/Staff Ratio (Group Level):Results indicate that among subsidies, only the state
subsidy per child in poverty has a significant effect on the child/staff ratio at the group
level. Presence of resource and referral agencies also increase the child/staff ratio at the
group level. Also when the maximum center group size regulation for 25-36 months
becomes more stringent, the child/staff ratio at the group level decreases.
Child/Staff Ratio (Center Level): When the regulations for the maximum child/staff ratio
for age groups 13-24 months and 37-60 months become lax, the child/staff ratio for the
center increases. As the regulation for maximum group size for infants becomes
stringent, the child/staff ratio decreases. An interesting finding is that as the regulations
for maximum group size for age groups 13-24 months and 25-36 months become
stringent, the child/staff ratio for the center increases. Another significant finding is that
when a center is located in a rural area the child/staff ratio is significantly lower.
Center Weighted Average Hourly Fees: Maximum group size regulations for age groups
25-36 months and 37-60 months have a negative effect on center hourly fee. Maximum
child staff regulations for age groups 13-24 months and 37-60 months have a negative
effect on center hourly fee. Maximum child staff regulations for age groups 0-12 months
and 25-36 months have a positive effect on center hourly fee. Findings also indicate that
the center average hourly price is lower when there is a resource and referral agency
present. Cost adjusted prekindergarten funds and JOBS child care subsidies have a
negative effect on average hourly fee. Cost adjusted social services block grant and state
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subsidy per child in poverty have a positive effect on the average hourly price. A major
finding of this dissertation is the interaction of subsidy and regulatory variables.
Another major finding is that child/staff ratio at the group level is lower when there is an
interaction between geographic location and nature of center sponsorship.
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter I- Issues and Objectives....................................................................................1
Chapter II- Literature Review..........................................................................................6
Low-Income Child Care Market...................................................................6
Affordability of Child Care...........................................................................8
Accessibility of Care...................................................................................10
Quality of Care............................................................................................12
Child Care Subsidies...................................................................................18
Chapter III- Conceptual Framework..............................................................................25
Choice of the Type of Non-Family Care....................................................27
Demand and Supply of Child Care............................................................28
Hedonic Price Equation..............................................................................29
Reduced Form Equations...........................................................................30
Chapter IV - Data..............................................................................................................31
Chapter V- Empirical Model...........................................................................................35
Functional Form and Statistical Analysis.....................................................50
Chapter VI- Empirical Results and Policy Implications..................................................68
Interaction Effects........................................................................................68
Policy Implications......................................................................................96
Chapter VII- Summary and Conclusions.......................................................................98
Bibliography............................................................................................100
Viii
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1- Data................................................................................................................. ...33
Table 2- Dependent and Explanatory Variables................................................................38
Table 3- Descriptive Statistics...........................................................................................46
Table 4- Final Linear Specification (Group)......................................................................52
Table 5- Final Linear Specification (Child/Staff Ratio)....................................................54
Table 6- Final Linear Specification (Center Fees).............................................................55
Table 7- General to Simple Model (Group).......................................................................59
Table 8- General to Simple Model (Child/Staff Ratio).....................................................61
Table 9- General to Simple Model (Center Fees)..............................................................62
Table 10- Non Linear Specification (Group).....................................................................64
Table 11- Non Linear Specification (Child/Staff Ratio)....................................................65
Table 12- Non Linear Specification (Center Fees)............................................................66
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1- Effect of state subsidy on Child/Staff Ratio (Group).........................................70
Figure 2- Interaction of state subsidy and maximum group size ...................................... 71
Figure 3- Effect of group size regulation on Child/Staff Ratio.........................................72
Figure 4- Interaction of R&R and north east.....................................................................75
Figure 5- Interaction between public school sponsor and rural area..................................76
Figure 6- Interaction between church sponsor and rural area............................................77
Figure 7-Interaction between public school sponsor and central city .............. 79
Figure 8- Interaction of R&R and maximum group size on Child/Staff Ratio.................80
Figure 9- Effect of child/staff regulation (37-60) months on Child/Staff Ratio
(C enter)......................................................................................................... . 82
Figure 10- Effect of group size regulation (25-36) months on Child/Staff Ratio..............84
Figure 11-Effect of group size regulation (0-12) months on Child/Staff Ratio.................86
Figure 12-Interaction between maximum group size regulation and rural........................87
Figure 13-Effect of group size regulation (37-60) months on Hourly Fee.......................90
Figure 14-Effect of child/staff regulation (0-12 mths) on Hourly Fee.......................91
Figure 15-Interaction of R&R agencies and child staff regulation...................................92
Figure 16-Interaction of prekindergarten funds and group size regulation......................94
Figure 17-Interaction of SSBG subsidy and group size regulation..................................95
x
CHAPTER ONE
ISSUES AND OBJECTIVES
From the Great Depression when the first federal program to subsidize children
was started to the 101 st Congress in 1990, and to the recently signed welfare law titled
"Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996" child care
for low-income families has been given a high priority by the federal government. There
are two reasons behind these child care subsidies. First, to promote economic self-
sufficiency among poor families so that they no longer remain a burden to the public and
second, to prevent future burden to the society by promoting the health and development
of poor children (Hofferth, 1993).
Economic Self-sufficiency
The goal of welfare has changed from supporting poor women to stay at home, to
providing them with employment or employment training. The passage of the Family
Support Act of 1988 and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 are a testimony to this. Under the Family Support Act of
1988, the focus is on preparing mothers with children age three and older for self-
sufficiency through employment in a job training and education program appropriately
called "JOBS" (Job Opportunity and Basic Skills). More recently, economic self-
sufficiency has been given a high priority by the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. Under this Act, the work participation rate for
welfare recipients increases from 25 percent in fiscal year 1997 to 50 percent in fiscal
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year 2002. Also Block grant funds under the new welfare law cannot be used for adults
who have received welfare for more than five years (Katz, 1996).
Health and Development of Poor Children
There is clear evidence that preschool education is beneficial for the cognitive and
social development of poor children. Several studies have indicated that disadvantaged
children benefit most from quality intervention programs (Burchinal, Lee, and Ramey,
1989; McCartney, Scarr, Phillips, and Grajek, 1985; Lee, Brooks-Gunn, Schnur, and
Liaw, 1990; Lee, Schnur, and Brooks-Gunn, 1988; Darlington, Royce, Snipper, and
Lazar, 1980).
These two issues -- economic self-sufficiency and health and development of poor
children-- were the guiding force of the 101 st Congress in 1990 (Hofferth, 1993). The
1990 Legislation, which greatly expanded the child care subsidies, contained components
ranging from providing tax credits to working poor families to expansion of funding for
Head Start -- the federal program whose goals are to improve the social skills, learning
ability, and health and nutrition status of low-income children so that they can begin
school on an equal footing with their more economically advantaged peers (Hofferth,
1993; Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, 1991). Little
research has been done on the effect of these subsidies. Till now, efforts have been
concentrated on the effects of Dependent Child Care Tax Credit (Robins, 1990;
Garfinkel, Meyer, and Wong, 1990). To partially fill in this gap, this study examines the
effect of subsidies on price and quality of child care for low-income families.
2
Child Care Providers for Low-Income Children
For background, the child care market for low income families is briefly described
here. The child care market has four participants -- parents whose children need care,
children who need care, providers who provide care and government whose role
influences use of child care arrangements through subsidies and regulations. Child care
providers can fall into any one of the following categories -- relatives caring in their own
home or in child's home, whether paid or unpaid; babysitter providing care in the child's
home; center - based care which provides care in a child care center away from the child'
home and family day care provider who is a nonrelative providing care in the provider's
own home.
This research assumes importance due to the following issues:
--- In light of the goal of welfare reform to promote self-sufficiency among welfare
recipients, the demand for child care among low-income families will increase
substantially.
--- The spending by the federal and state governments under the four child care
programs for low-income families (Family Support Act of 1988, Transitional Child Care
(TCC), At-Risk Child Care Program and Child Care and Development Block Grant
program of 1990), was $1.5 billion in fiscal year 1992 (General Accounting Office,
[GAO], 1994). It is important that we know the effect of these subsidies on price and
quality of care, due to the huge financial outlay involved.
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--- Child care costs consumed as much as 27% of monthly income for families with
incomes below poverty who paid for child care in 1991, compared with 7% for families
with incomes above poverty (GAO, 1994).
--- Child care subsidies also significantly affect the mother's decision to work. A
GAO study (1994) " Child Care subsidies increase likelihood that low-income mothers
will work" found that the impact of full subsidization of care will have the greatest effect
on poor mothers when compared to near-poor and non-poor mothers.
The model predicts that providing a full subsidy to mothers who pay for child care
could increase the proportion of poor mothers who work from 29% to 44%, and that of
near-poor mothers from 43% to 57% and non-poor mothers from 55% to 65%.
--- Good quality child care according to The National Academy of Sciences Panel on
Child Care Policy is affected by group size, staff-child ratios, care giver education and
training and care giver stability and continuity ( Hayes, Palmer, and Zaslow, 1990).
Phillips, Voran, Kisker, and Whitebook (1994) found that quality of care provided by
child care centers serving a high proportion of low-income children varies and is
sometimes inadequate in some of the key indices of quality.
This research will enable us to know if the current system of child care
subsidies has the desired effect. If it is found that the effect of subsidies is
negative on price and positive on quality of care then it can be concluded that child care
subsidies have resulted in lowering the price of care and improving the quality of care.
If it is found that the child care subsidies have a positive effect on price of care and a
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negative effect on quality, then it is obvious that the child care subsidies have an
undesirable effect on both price and quality.
Chapter 11 will discuss literature review, chapter 11 1 will outline the conceptual
framework, data will be discussed in chapter IV, chapter V will describe the empirical
model, chapter VI will discuss the empirical results and policy implications, and
chapter VII will discuss summary and conclusions.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
Low-income Child Care Market
Low-income children are more likely to be cared for within the family. 48% of low-
income children under age 5 and children aged 5 to 12 years are taken care of mainly by
their parents (i.e for the greatest amount of hours per week) (Brayfield, Deich, and
Hofferth, 1993). Lamer and Mitchell (1992) found that 60% of low-income children were
cared for within the family as compared to 33% of high-income children. Also relatives
play an important role in caring for low-income children. Brayfield, Deich, and Hofferth
(1993) found that relatives were the main source of care for 22% of low income children
under 5 years of age and 20% of low-income children aged 5 to 12 years. They also
found that grandparents are a predominant source of relative care. Nearly 17% of all
low-income children under age 5 were cared for mainly by a grandparent. Other studies
have similar findings. Marshall and Marx (1991) found that 27% of low-income children
aged below 6 years and 60% of low-income children aged 6 to 12 years were cared for by
relatives. Maynard (1990) found that 30 to 33% of preschool children in low-income
areas were cared for by relatives. The importance of center care for low income children
has mixed findings. Marshall and Marx (1991) found that full-time care is especially
important for low-income children. 36% of low-income children younger than six who
are in child care are in full-time center care. Maynard (1990) found that 20% of
preschoolers from low-income areas are in center based care. According to Brayfield,
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Deich, and Hofferth (1993), 15% of low-income children under 5 years and 6% of
children aged 5 to 12 years used center based care. The findings on use of Family Day
Care by low-income children ranges widely. Maynard (1990) found about 25% of
preschool children in low-income areas are cared for by family day care centers. Marshall
and Marx (1991) found that 18% of low-income children below 6 years of age and 6% of
children aged 6 to 12 years are cared for by family day care providers. A much lower use
of family day care providers was found by Brayfield, Deich, and Hofferth (1993). They
found that 8% of low-income children aged under 5 years and 4% of children aged 5 to
12 years mainly used family day care providers.
To summarize, relatives especially grandparents play a significant role in the care
of low-income children. Center based care also plays an important role in the care of low-
income preschoolers. With the recent emphasis on getting welfare recipients off welfare
and into employment training the importance of center care has increased.
According to Robins (1991) the goals of a national child care policy are
affordability, accessibility and quality. Keeping these goals in mind, the current
literature on low-income child care will be surveyed.
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Affordability of Child Care
Price is one of the most important factors affecting parental choice of child care
arrangement. If the price of a particular type of child care arrangement is higher, the
probability of using that type of care is less (Hofferth and Wissoker, 1992;
Yeager, 1979). Spiegelman and Robins (1978) also found that demand for market
form of child care (day care centers and licensed family day care centers) is price elastic.
It was also found that welfare recipients who are often eligible for subsidized child care,
are more likely than comparable women not receiving welfare to use paid care outside
their home for younger preschoolers (Leibowitz, Waite, and Witsberger, 1988).
It has been found that low-income families could afford to pay only 6-7% of their
income for child care (Dubnoff, 1986 cited in Marshall and Marx, 1992). Brayfield,
Deich, and Hofferth (1993) found that low-income families spend an average of 23% of
their weekly gross family income for child care for children under 5 years. Other studies
have also found high proportion of child care costs to income. Hofferth (1995) found that
working-poor families spent 33% of their weekly household income on child care costs.
Maynard (1990) found that low-income families spent an average of 20% of family
income and 30% of the mother's income on child care.
High costs of child care has a negative effect on probability of labor force
participation of women. Maynard (1990) found that 60% of the low-income mothers who
were not already employed reported that they would work if adequate and affordable
child care were available to them. Marshall and Marx (1991) report that lack of
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affordable, quality child care is a major problem faced by low-income families. They also
found that nearly half of low-income women not employed now would look for a job or
seek training if affordable, quality child care becomes available. The correlation
coefficient between paying for care and participating in the labor market is -0.38 for
married women (Connelly, 1992). The higher the cost, lesser the probability of
participating in the labor market. High child care costs are also a greater barrier to women
in poverty. Kimmel (1995) found that for the full poverty sample of single mothers, the
price elasticity of employment is -0.346, and for white and black single mothers in
poverty the price elasticities are -1.362 and -0.345 respectively. Fronstin and Wissoker
(1994) found that the estimated effects of price on employment were more negative in the
low-income samples than in the high income samples. In a study by Blau and Robins
(1989) it was found that higher child care costs are estimated to lower the birth rate for
nonemployed women. They also found that higher child care costs also increase the rate
of leaving employment and reduce the rate of entering employment.
Subsidies have a positive effect on the probability of employment by women.
Connelly (1992) in her study of child-care costs on married women's labor force
participation found that if child care costs were subsidized by 50%, 64% of married
women with young children would be employed, and if there were universal no-cost child
care available, 68.7% of women would be employed. Kimmel (1995) in her study of low-
income single mothers found that provision of free child care causes a 132% increase in
the employment probability of white single mothers. She also found that the
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implementation of a sliding-scale increases employment of white single mothers by
105%.
A 1994 GAO study found that subsidizing child care costs has the greatest impact
on poor and near-poor mother's decision to work, as compared with nonpoor mothers.
Full subsidization to mothers who pay for child care increases the proportion of poor
mothers working from 29% to 44%, and that of near-poor mothers from 43% to 57%.
The probability of nonpoor mothers working could increase from 55% to 65%.
In short, higher child care costs influences the parental choices of care and has an
impact on the probability of labor participation of women. Labor participation of women
has assumed greater significance given the proposed changes in welfare.
Accessibility of care
Low-income working families face major constraints in finding accessible child care of
good quality. For a welfare mother to use a child care arrangement for employment, it
must be conveniently located, and be dependable (Sonenstein and Wolf, 1991). Also
working poor families are more likely to be in part-time employment. Hofferth (1995)
found that 45% of working-poor families worked full-time compared to three quarters of
mothers in other families. Maynard (1990) found that proportionately more low-income
parents work part-time ( two-thirds vs one-third of all working mothers). She also found
that part-time employment tends to restrict child care choices to family day care. Hofferth
(1995) reports that only 2 out of 3 centers operate full-time, compared with almost all
family day care homes. Parents who need full-time care for their children have also to use
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more than one supplemental arrangement. Among low-income families, about 24% of
children under age 5 are in more than one supplemental arrangement on a regular basis
(Brayfield, Deich, and Hofferth, 1993). Also low-income working mothers need care at
odd hours ( between 6 P.M. and 7 A. M.) and weekends (Sonenstein and Wolf, 1991).
Centers seldom provide such extended hours care (Lamer and Mitchell, 1992). Hofferth
(1995) found that one-third of working-poor and more than one out of four working-class
mothers work weekends. Only 10% of centers and 6% of family day care homes provided
care on weekends. Also 13% of regulated and 20% of nonregulated family day care
providers provided care in the evenings, compared to only 3% of centers.
Centers seldom provide care for sick children when compared to family day care
providers. Sonenstein and Wolf (1991) in their study of 382 AFDC mothers found that
during the preceding eight months, the welfare mothers whose children were with
relatives or in family day care settings had missed one day of work to be with sick child,
while mothers using center care reported missed six days.
Low-income parents find it difficult to use center-based care because they are
more vulnerable to lay off (Lamer and Mitchell, 1992). Lack of reliable public
transportation inhibits the use of quality child care arrangements by low-income families.
Low-income families tend to live in low-income neighborhoods that are poorly
maintained, lack public transportation and community services (Lamer and Mitchell,
1992). Duncan and Hill (1977) found that locational characteristics were the most
important determinants of the choice of nursery school and day care facilities. Increasing
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the travel time from home to the place of child care arrangement reduces the likelihood of
using that arrangement by a small but significant amount (Yeager, 1979).
Quality of care
The first wave of studies asked whether participation in a family day care or day care
center was harmful to children. Once it was concluded with some certainty from research
findings that child care participation was not harmful to children's development (Hayes,
Palmer, and Zaslow, 1990), the second wave of research came into existence. The second
wave of child care research, still in progress according to Zaslow ( 1991) examines
children's development in light of variations in the environment of child care. According
to Zaslow (1991) research uses one or all the following three approaches to measuring
quality. The first approach, global or summary measures (e.g. high, medium, or low) is
based on composite picture of such factors as staff/child ratios, caregiver training,
organization of space, and daily routine. The second approach focuses on structural
measures (e.g. group size, staff/child ratio, care-giver qualifications, care giver training).
The third approach focuses on interactive behavior, particularly of care givers with
children (e.g. care-giver involvement, frequency of care-giver talk to children). The
outcomes measured under these approaches are the child's experiences in day care,
child's socioemotional and cognitive development.
Today a balanced approach prevails emphasizing the social skills and cognitive
development of the child (Mukerjee and Witte, 1992). The National Academy of Sciences
panel on Child care policy in its description of characteristics associated with children's
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development, emphasizes both emotional and social development of children. The
characteristics are:
i) Group size, staff-child ratios and care giver qualifications (called the iron
triangle);
ii) Care giver stability and continuity, which is important for the development
of secure attachments for the child;
iii) The structure and content of daily activities, which aid cognitive
development, and
iv) Space and facilities e.g. the age-appropriateness of the activity areas which
influence social interactions and development (Hayes, Palmer, and Zaslow,
1990 as cited in Kisker and Maynard, 1991).
Quality of child care services should be treated as multidimensional instead of
unidimensional in nature. Preston (1993) controls for vector of quality and social
externalities to compare production functions of profit and non-profit sectors. The vector
of quality attributes include proxies for labor quality: maximum salary paid, turnover rate
of care givers, child-to-staff ratio, parental participation in fundraising; staff selection;
budget review and care giving. Hagey (1992) develops a model of child care choice that
incorporates quality as a multidimensional concept. In this model consumers purchase a
vector of attributes of care rather than a level of child care quality. The consumers then
trade off these attributes of care in their choice of child care arrangement . The vector of
attributes include child-to-staff ratio, group size, provider training, proximity, and
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extended hours of care for each child care arrangement.
Zaslow (1991) found that in child care of higher overall quality and in care which
is higher in quality in terms of specific structural features, children experience a warmer
emotional climate and more frequent personal interactions with care givers. Phillips,
Scarr, and McCartney (1987) found that both parents and care givers in centers with
higher amounts of adult child verbal interactions rated the children as more considerate,
and care givers also rated them as more sociable, intelligent, and task oriented.
Child-staff ratios got mixed ratings. The effect of child-staff ratios on social
development got predicted parents rating of considerateness and caregiver rating of
anxiety (Phillips et al., 1987). Sonenstein and Wolfe (1991) found that a predictor of
satisfaction for mothers of children aged below 3 years and 3 to 5 years was the level of
adult supervision. For children below 3 years old lower child-staff ratio was associated
with higher level of satisfaction.
Arnett (1989) in his study of 22 day-care centers on the island of Bermuda found
that training was found to be related to less authoritarian child rearing attitudes and to a
more positive interaction style with children, with less punitiveness and detachment.
Whitebook, Howes, and Phillips (1989) in its study of 227 child care centers in five
metropolitan areas in the U.S. found that the quality of care provided by most centers was
rated as barely adequate. Better quality centers had higher wages, better work
environments, lower teaching staff turnover, better educated and trained staff and low
child staff ratio. Children attending lower-quality centers and centers with high staff
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turnover were less competent in language and social development. Whitebook et al.
(1989) found that formal education obtained by a teacher was a strong predictor of
appropriate teacher behavior and specialized training was important in infant
classrooms.
Numerous studies have dealt with the effect of quality intervention programs
on social and cognitive development for socioeconomically disadvantaged children.
Burchinal, Lee, and Ramey (1989) found that quality day care positively affects the
overall preschool cognitive level of socioeconomically disadvantaged children.
McCartney et al. (1985) found that disadvantaged children attending high-quality
government day care intervention program have better language skills, are more
considerate and more sociable than children attending other lower quality day care
programs. Research findings on follow up study of Head Start through grade 1, of 646
disadvantaged black children found that, on some measures of cognitive and analytical
ability children who participated in Head Start maintained substantive gains especially
when compared to children with no preschool (Lee et al., 1990). A one year follow up
study of disadvantaged children attending Head Start found that participation in Head
Start appeared to produce substantive 1-year gains on measures of cognitive ability for
low-income children. This advantage was clearer when compared to no preschool group
(Lee et al., 1988).
Whitebook et al. (1989) found that low and high-income children were more
likely than middle-income children to attend centers providing higher quality of care.
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Phillips et al (1994) concluded in their study of 32 low-income centers, that quality of
care provided in low-income and middle income centers is highly variable. Centers
catering to upper-income children provided the highest quality of care. Berger and Black
(1992) found that subsidies increase parental satisfaction of quality of care. A part of
child care literature is concerned with the modal choice of child care arrangements.
Leibowitz, Waite, and Witsberger (1988) found that parents did not pay more for care that
met recommended group size levels or recommended staff/child ratios. They also found
that highly educated women or women with higher income did not obtain quality care.
Staff-child ratio which is an indicator of quality is a factor in decision of type of care, but
not for all types of care arrangements (Hofferth and Wissoker 1992). The higher the
mother's wage greater is the probability of selecting center-based facility (Hofferth and
Wissoker 1992; Lehrer 1983; Spiegelman and Robins 1978; Duncan and Hill, 1977).
Brayfield and Hofferth (1995) found that higher the mother's earnings and higher the
family income from other sources, employed mothers allocated more money to child care
and the proportion of child care expenditures to overall family budget was smaller.
While Hofferth and Wissoker ( 1992) found that family income affected the
modal choice of care, Spiegelman and Robins ( 1978) and Duncan and Hill (1975) did not
find family income statistically significant in determining the modal choice of care. The
findings of the effect of husband's income is also mixed. While (Lehrer, 1983) found
husband's income determined modal choice of care, (Leibowitz, Waite and Witsberger,
1988) found no effect of husband's income on type of care. Mother's hours of work
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determines the modal choice of care (Lehrer, 1983). The lower the level of the mother's
labor supply, the more likely it is that dependence will be placed upon relatives rather
than upon baby-sitters or day-care centers, and, comparing the latter two modes, the lower
the likelihood of dependence on center care. Education of the mother is an important
determinant of type of care. Duncan and Hill (1975) found strong relationship between
average education of parents and choice of nursery school and day care center form of
care. Mothers who are college educated prefer to enroll their children in educationally
based programs that require some form of payment (Brayfield and Hofferth, 1995).
Leibowitz, Waite, and Witsberger (1988) found that mother's education affects the
chances that the mother will choose age-appropriate care--care in child's home for
younger preschoolers and center care for older preschoolers.
The age of child bears a strong relationship to mode of care arrangement. Presence
of children aged 0 - 3 increases the odds of choosing a baby sitter over day care center.
The presence of children in the 3 - 6 years increases the odds in favor of nursery schools
or day care centers over relatives ( Lehrer, 1983; Duncan and Hill, 1975). As the number
of children increases, it becomes more likely that reliance will be placed on a relative or
babysitter instead of day care center (Lehrer, 1983; Duncan and Hill, 1975). When there
is a teenager in the household, relatives are the preferred child care arrangement (Lehrer,
1983). Residence in the South and West increases the odds in favor of day care center
(Lehrer, 1983; Duncan and Hill 1975). Leibowitz, Waite and Witsberger, 1988 found that
group care for preschool children (day care or nursery school ) is significantly higher in
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the South. City size also influences the choice of mode of care. Families living in the
largest cities were generally more likely to choose day care centers and nursery schools
than were families living in smaller cities and towns (Duncan and Hill, 1977, 1975).
Religion has a limited effect on choice of mode of care. Lehrer (1983) and
Duncan and Hill (1975) found affiliation with the Catholic Church has a negative impact
on choice of day care facilities. Duncan and Hill (1975) found that Baptists are more
likely to choose the formal mode of care. Race has no impact on choice of mode of care
(Lehrer, 1983; Duncan and Hill, 1975).
Child Care Subsidies
Both federal and state programs provide child care assistance to low-income
families.
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Federal Programs
The major federal programs providing child care subsidies are as follows:
Family Support Act of 1988 (FSA) FSA which seeks to promote economic self-
sufficiency of welfare recipients, guarantees child care to employed Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) recipients and to participants in the Job Opportunities and
Basic Skills Training (JOBS) program, as well as other AFDC recipients in state
approved education and training (GAO, 1994). Those parents on AFDC who have
children age three and older can be required to participate in the JOBS program; those
with children as young as age one may be included at the option of the state. Also, FSA
created the Transitional Child Care (TCC) program, which guarantees a year of
transitional child care to AFDC recipients after they leave the welfare rolls due to
increased income.
Primary responsibility for JOBS rests with each state's welfare agency. The
federal legislation requires states to provide these JOBS services to 7 percent in 1990 of
the non-exempt caseload. The participation rate increases to 20% in 1995. (Hagen and
Lurie, 1992). Federal funds under this program are provided to states to fund child care
entitlement.
At-Risk Child Care Program The At-Risk Child Care Program was part of the Omnibus
Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA 90). The Act increased funding for the existing
AFDC child care program to provide child care services to low-income, non-AFDC
families would be at risk of becoming eligible for AFDC. State matching funds
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are required to draw federal funds. Federal funds available under this program is up to
$300 million dollars for each of the fiscal years 1992, 1993 and 1994 (Poersch, Adams,
and Sandfort, 1994).
Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG) The CCDBG was enacted under the
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA 90) . This program provides Federal funds
to States, Tribes, and Territories to support child care services for low-income families,
especially children of families with very low family income and to children with special
needs.
The CCDBG is funded at $ 750 million in fiscal year 1991, $825 million in 1992,
$892.7 million in 1993 and 892.7 million in 1994 (Morse and Steisel 1990; Poersch,
Adams, and Sandfort, 1994).
Head Start Head Start began operating in 1965 under the general authority of the
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. Head Start provides a wide range of services to
primarily low-income children, ages 0-5, and their families. Its goals are to improve the
social competence, learning ability, health and nutrition status of low-income children so
that they can begin school on an equal footing with their more economically advantaged
peers (Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, 1991)
Head Start was reauthorized by Congress in the Head Start Expansion and
Improvement Act of 1990. This important legislation authorized sufficient funding to
serve all eligible children by 1994 and contained provisions to improve quality. Congress
increased Head Start funding by $399.8 million in Fiscal Year 1991. Under the provisions
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of the Act, $195.2 million of this increase was set aside for quality improvements; $200
million was available for expansion; $10 million was reserved for Training and Technical
Assistance (T&TA) (National Head Start Association, 1993). Head Start programs
normally operate part-day for part of the year (Hofferth, 1993).
The two other major Head Start legislations are 1) The Head Start Improvement
Act of 1992 which among several additional changes it made to the Head Start programs
guaranteed quality improvement funds to all 1993 grantees and 2) The Human Services
Reauthorization Act of 1994 which reauthorizes the Head Start program through 1998.
The 1994 legislation specifies that 25% of new funds must be reserved for quality
improvement activities (DeWoody, CWLA, 1994)
Title XX : The Social Services Block Grant In 1974, Congress created a new title XX of
the Social Security Act under Public law 92-672 authorizing an entitlement for states for
providing social services (Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of
Representatives, 1991). Many states use some of these funds for the purpose of providing
child care subsidies ( Poersch, Adams, and Sandfort, 1994).
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (Public Law 97-35) amended
title XX of the Social Security Act to establish a "Block Grant to States for Social
Services" (Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, 1991). Over
the years there has been a substantial reduction in Title XX purchasing power. In Fiscal
Year 1993, $2.8 billion was appropriated for the Title XX Social Services Block Grant
( Poersch, Adams, and Sandfort, 1994).
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Dependent Care Tax Credit Under section 21 of the Internal Revenue Code, a
nonrefundable credit against income tax liability is available for up to 30 percent of a
limited amount of employment-related dependent care expenses. Eligible employment-
related expenses are limited to $2400, if there is one qualifying individual, or $4,800, if
there are two or more qualifying individuals. The maximum amount of the credit is $720
for one qualifying individual and $1,440 for two or more qualifying individuals.
Because of lack of variation, the federal dependent credit was not included as a
subsidy in the study. Many states also reimburse parents for child care expenses. Twenty-
three states (including the District of Columbia) had Child and Dependent Care income
tax provisions in tax year 1993 (Steinschneider, Campbell, and Williams, 1994). These
provisions may be credits or deductions. Credits reduce the state tax liability. Deductions
reduce the amount of income subject to the state tax and thus reduce the amount of state
tax owed. The state tax credits varied across states and this was used as a measure of
subsidy for this study.
State Programs
States provide child care assistance either by subsidizing the cost of child care or
by providing early childhood services to a children from low-income families.
Funding for these programs is provided out of state funds or drawn out of federal child
care programs. State child care programs can be grouped into the following
categories (Adams and Sandfort, 1994):
22
Economic Self-Sufficiency Child care assistance is offered to low-income parents who
are working or in training programs. Child care funds for welfare recipients are
administered through states Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) programs
(Adams and Sandfort, 1994).
Prekindergarten Programs Prekindergarten Programs for this study are those state-funded
initiatives that provide at least some education-related services to prekindergarten age
children (Adams and Sandfort, 1994). By the year 1991-92 school year, 32 states were
investing a total of about $665 million in these Prekindergarten programs providing
services to almost 290,000 children (Adams and Sandfort, 1994). State-funded
Prekindergarten initiatives were aimed mainly at low income four year old children.
The definition of low-income children varies among states. Some states defines low-
income child as children whose families were eligible for AFDC assistance or whose
family income was below a certain specified state level or both. Besides income other
criteria include children with disabilities, children whose primary language was other than
English, children in families with a history of school failure or illiteracy, children of teen
parents or migrant families, abused or neglected or drug-exposed infants or children who
lived in families with a history of substance abuse or who lived in inadequate housing
(Adams and Sandfort, 1994, pp. 51-53).
Resource and Referral Agencies Resource and referral agencies aid parents in finding
suitable child care facilities. These agencies help parents identify child care location,
fees and availability of child care facilities. The role of resource and referral agencies is
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limited because they lack legal authority and staff capacity to offer judgements on the
adequacy of care (Meyers, 1995).
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CHAPTER THREE
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The first step in developing the conceptual framework is sketching out the structural
equation. The structural equation helps us understand the underlying behavior of
individuals and firms making a decision. By using structural equations we can understand
the behavior of low-income families who are the demanders of child care, making
decisions about the purchase of child care. Structural equations help us also understand
the behavior of providers who are the suppliers of child care, making decisions about the
supply of child care. On the demand side, families make decisions whether to purchase
child care in the market and if so what type of child care. Structural equations help us
understand the factors behind these decisions.
Structural equations also help us specify a second set of relationships called
reduced-form equations. Reduced-form equation contains endogenous variables on the
left-hand side and exogenous variables on the right-hand side. Endogenous variables
are those whose values are determined within the model under study. For e.g, price of
care is endogenous. Exogenous variables are those whose values are determined
outside the model or predetermined. For e.g., exogenous variables include rules for
administration of subsidy, community characteristics and child care regulations.
Building on the earlier models describing how families choose to care for their
children (Chipty and Witte, 1994) the following structural equations are developed. The
25
first structural equation is the decision by a low income family is whether to have family
or non family child care. A number of factors influence this decision. It may include
family characteristics (education of the mother, family income, mother's wages, number
of children in the family), care characteristics ( quality of care, education and training of
the provider), wages and hours of work of family member if they choose to care within
family or use nonfamily care, price of family care and nonfamily care ( net of subsidies),
Community characteristics (accessibility and outreach methods used by subsidy programs
in the community, size of community) and availability of subsidies (sliding scale fee,
vouchers, Child Care Dependent Tax Credit, Head Start).
Family/Nonfamily = d(FAMCHAR, CARECHARf, CARECHAR,,...,
CARECHARnrJ, WAGESf, HOURSf, WAGESI,...,WAGES,..., HOUR1 ,...,HOU~I,
PRICE Df, PRICEDJ, COMMCHAR, SUBSIDY).
Famchar is the family characteristics (education of the mother, race, number of
children under the age of 13); CARECHARf is the characteristics of family care,
CARECHARn,,..., CARECHARa , is the characteristics of nonfamily care arrangements
from 1 to J types (education and training of the provider, staff-child ratio); the wages and
hours of work of family members responsible for child care if these individuals choose to
care for their children within the family, denoted WAGESf and HOURSf; and the wages
and hours available if these family members choose one of the J nonfamily care
arrangements, denoted WAGES,..., WAGES ; HOURS,...,HOURS*; the prices of family
care, denoted PRICEDf; and prices of nonfamily child care, denoted PRICEDI..PRICEDj
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(net of subsidies) for the J types of nonfamily child care available and the characteristics
of the community (COMMCHAR), and subsidies available (SUBSIDY).
The estimation of the reduced form of the above structural equation will give
us the effect of subsidies on the choice of care. For e.g, we can discern the effect of
availability of Head Start funding on the choice of care.
Choice of the Type of Nonfamily Care
Once of the family has decided on nonfamily care for its children, it is faced with
a second decision--the type of nonfamily care to utilize. Nonfamily care refers to all care
by providers other than members of the immediate family, including relatives outside the
immediate household and family day care providers. The type of care decision is
influenced by subsidy programs available (program budgets, rules, eligibility and
outreach methods) denoted SUBSIDY, Characteristics of care from nonfamily types 1 to J
denoted CARECHAR, ...,CARECHAR1 ; Prices (net of subsidies) denoted
PRICEDI...PRICEDj for the J types of nonfamily child care available, the work schedules
and wages of working family members, particularly the primary care giver (denoted
WAGES,,..., WAGESj; HOURS1 ,... HOURS); community characteristics
(COMMCHAR) and Family characteristics such as income (FAMCHAR).
TYPEf= f (SUBSIDY, CARECHAR,,..., CARECHAR , PRICED ,...,PRICEDj,
WAGES1,....WAGES, HOURS,,... HOURS, COMMCHAR, FAMCHAR).
Estimating the reduced form of the above structural equation gives us
the effect of program rules for administration of subsidies on the choice
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of type of care.
Demand and Supply of Child Care
The next two structural equations deal with demand and supply of child care.
Equilibrium is determined by the interaction of demand and supply. Demand for any
given type of care is determined by (1) the price of that type of care, net of any subsidies
received directly by the parents (denoted Priced); (2) the work schedules of family
members (hours); (3) family characteristics (denoted famchar including family income
adjusted for child care expenditures); (4) the characteristics of the children in the family
(denoted childchar); (5) and community characteristics related to this type of child care in
the local community (denoted Commchard) (6) care characteristics (denoted Carechari)
and (7) subsidies.
Dnf= fl (Priced, Hoursw, Famchar, Childchar, Commchard, Carechar, Subsidies).
Supply of care (Snt) depends upon (1) the price received for that type of care
(Prices,) by providers, that is, the sum of parental payments and subsidy payments by
governmental and nongovernmental agencies, (2) Subsidies, (3) Costs of labor and other
inputs (Pf), (4) the characteristics of the child to be cared for (childchar), (5) the
characteristics of care provided (carechar) , (6) community characteristics related to child
care supply (Commchar,), (7) nature and administration of regulation in the community
(Regs) and (8) characteristics of provider (provchar).
Sef= f, (Prices, subsidies, Pf, childchar, carechar, commchar,, regs, provchar)
The interplay of demand and supply will determine the market price and quantity of
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child care available for each type of care for unsubsidized families.
Hedonic Price Equation
Economists have developed a model called the hedonic model which estimates the
implicit prices for the characteristics of care. To determine the implicit market price of
each of the characteristics of care, the hedonic model begins with the equilibrium market
price for care which is determined by the interplay of supply and demand.
The model gives an equation, called the hedonic price equation, that relates this
equilibrium price to the characteristics of care,
Pdj = g (Carechar)
This hedonic price equation allows us to uncover the market's implicit valuation
of the characteristics of care. These valuations are the partial derivatives of the hedonic
price function with respect to each characteristic of care. For each characteristic of care,
there will be a distinct implicit price. The vector of implicit prices is denoted by Pcarechar-
The implicit prices for the attributes of care are used as explanatory variables in
the demand equations. Family characteristics, child characteristics, provider
characteristics and regulations including implicit prices affect the demand and supply of
characteristics of care.
CarechariD = hi (Pcarechari, famchar, childchar)
Carecharis = h2 (Pcarechari, Regs, childchar, Provchar).
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Famchar is a vector of family characteristics, childchar is a vector of child
characteristics, provchar is a vector of provider characteristics, regs is a set of regulatory
variables affecting this characteristic of care, Pcarechan is the implicit price for this
characteristic of care.
Reduced form equations
Reduced form equations enable us to discern the net effect of exogenous variables
on the endogenous variables. The exogenous variables are vector of attributes relating to
family characteristics, child characteristics, regulations, subsidy, community
characteristics, and the prices of inputs. Reduced form equations help us
find the effect of each of the exogenous variables on each of the endogenous variables.
For examples we can find the effect of subsidies on the price and quality of care.
The reduced form equations will be estimated for price of care and quality indicated by
(staff-child ratio at the center as well as the group level).
Staff-child ratio = f3 (Famchar, Provchar, regs, childchar, subsidy, commchar, Pf)
(Group Level)
Staff-child ratio = f2 (Famchar, Provchar, regs, childchar, subsidy, commchar, Pf)
(Center Level)
Price of care = fl (Famchar, Provchar, regs, childchar, subsidy, commchar, Pf)
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CHAPTER FOUR
DATA
The 1990 Profile of Child Care Settings (PCCS) data contains a nationally representative
sample of early education and care providers drawn from the universe of formal early
education and care programs. Kisker et al (1991) provide a detailed description of the
PCCS data. The sample was selected in two stages. In the first stage, a stratified sample
of 100 counties that are representative of counties in the U.S. were selected. Counties
were stratified according to region, metropolitan status, and poverty level, and sample
counties were selected which had a probability proportional to the size of the population
under age 5. The 100 counties became the 100 PSU's.
In the second stage of the sampling, a stratified random sample of early education
and care providers were selected from the 100 PSU's initially selected. In order to draw
the provider sample, a sample frame list of eligible providers stratified according to
whether they were home based programs, head start programs, public-school based
programs, or other center based programs was assembled. Random samples of programs
were then drawn from each stratum. Interviews were conducted from October 1989 to
February 1990 using computer assisted telephone interviewing methods. A total sample
of 2,089 center based programs were interviewed.
The PCCS data permits in depth analysis of child care settings. For child care
centers, the PCCS collected detailed information up to 20 child care groups and up to 10
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pricing arrangements for each center. The PCCS data also collected detailed information
on subsidies received by providers and families.
The other major data source for demographics is the five-digit zip-code file of the
1990 U.S. Population Census. The zip-code files contained the center identification
numbers which made it possible to match the centers and Zip-codes where each center
was located. Where it was not possible to obtain five-digit zipcode demographic data, the
1990 Census of Population and Housing was used. The 1990 Census of Population and
Housing gives demographic data pertaining to the county where each center is located.
The other data sources used in the study are as follows:
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Table 1
Data Source
Data Source
Cost of Living Index for Urban Areas American Chamber of Commerce Researchers
Association, 1991, 2 nd quarter
Community Characteristics
1.Crime US Federal Bureau of Investigation,
unpublished data, 1991
2.Civilian unemployment US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and
Unemployment for State and Local Areas, fiche,
annual, 1991
3. Direct General Expenditure U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1982 and 1987
Census of Governments, Government Finances,
Compendium of Government
Finances, (GC82(4)-5 and GC87(4)-5).
Regulations
State and local regulations Morgan, G. (1989). State liability insurance
requirements and regulatory information
(Table 3). Massachusetts: Work/Family
Directions, Inc.
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) (1992).
States face difficulties enforcing standards and
promoting quality child care.
Washington, DC: General Accounting Office
(March 1991 to May 1992).
Cost of Inputs
Median Contract Rent per room 1990 Census of Housing
(table continues)
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Data Source
Data Source
Subsidies
1.JOBS Program Committee on Ways & Means, U.S. House
of Representatives. (1991). 1991 Green
Book. Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office.
2.Head Start Program U.S. Bureau of the Census (1994).
Consolidated federal funds report on
CD-ROM, fiscal year 1984-1993.
3.Pre-Kindergarten Program Mitchell, Seligson, and Marx, 1989;
Adams (1992).
4.Title XX and State Subsidized Child Adams (1992)
Care
5. Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit Steinschneider (1994).
6. Resource and Referral (R&R) Agencies Curry (1996)
34
CHAPTER FIVE
EMPIRICAL MODEL
The next step in this study is to identify empirical measures for the endogenous as well
as exogenous variables and to specify a functional form for the reduced form equations.
Table 2 gives the definition of the dependent and independent variables suggested by
the conceptual model. Table 3 contains a descriptive statistics of the dependent
variables and explanatory variables.
This study seeks to estimate three reduced form equations. The dependent variable
is the child staff ratio at the group level for the first reduced form equation, (N=1939).
Child-staff ratio at the group level is the ratio of total children over all groups to total
teachers and assistant teachers over all groups for each center. The second reduced form
equation is when the dependent variable is the child staff ratio for the center as a whole,
(N=1808). Child-staff ratio is the ratio of total children to total teachers and assistant
teachers for each center. The third reduced form equation that will be estimated is when
the dependent variable is the weighted cost- adjusted average hourly fees charged by the
child care centers, (N=1467). The PCCS survey obtained information of three different
types of fee structures from each center. Programs that charge ten or fewer fees were
asked about each fee, including the hours per day and days per week covered by the fee
and the number of children for whom that fee was charged. Fees were converted into
hourly fee rates. Then, the average fee was calculated by weighting each fee by the
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number of children for whom that fee was charged. Programs that charge more than ten
fees were asked only about their highest, lowest and average fees. The average fee was
recorded as it was given by the provider.
The empirical measures for the exogenous variables are as follows:
Subsidy The measures for subsidies include cost of living adjusted federal payments to
states for child care under Job Opportunity and Basic Skills (JOBS) and Transitional
Child Care (TCC) [under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act] per child aged 3-13 years
in poverty, in the center's state; the cost of living adjusted federal Head Start dollars spent
per child aged 0-5 years in poverty in the center's PSU area; the cost of living adjusted
state and federal dollars for prekindergarten by state per child aged 3 to 4 years in
poverty; the cost of living adjusted Title XX child care expenditure by state per child in
poverty 0 to 13 years; cost of living adjusted state subsidized child care by state per child
in poverty 0 to 13 years; a binary equal to 1 if the state has Child and Dependent Care Tax
Provision available; cost of living adjusted maximum income tax deduction per family
for child care for a maximum of two dependents.
Regulations Chipty (1995) and Chipty and Witte (1994) found that regulations have
"spillover" effects. For example, regulations for centers have effects on family day care
providers as well as centers. Based on their work, the following empirical measures were
chosen for regulations: number of mandated inspections per year for center care; the
inverse of the maximum group size permitted for each age group for center care and the
maximum permitted child/staff ratio for each age group for centers.
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To find out the effects of resource and referral (RR) agencies on child care
markets, a binary equal to 1 if the center was located in a PSU area with an R&R agency
in 1990, was used as an empirical measure.
Family and.community characteristics were controlled for in the areas where the
center is located. Family and community characteristics control variables include
cost of living adjusted median family income, percent families below poverty level,
percent civilian unemployment, percent White, Black and Hispanic population and
persons per household. Cost of living adjusted median hourly wage of teachers and
median contract rent per room in the PSU areas where the center is located are the control
variables for the cost of inputs. Median hourly wage of teachers was obtained from the
1990 PCCS data for each PSU area. Median contract rent per room for each PSU area
was calculated from the 1990 Census of Housing data by dividing Median Contract Rent
by the median number of rooms. The control variables for provider characteristics include
whether the center is profit or non profit, whether sponsored by Head Start, public school
or religious group and the number of months the center is in operation.
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Table 2
Dependent and Explanatory Variables
Dependent Variables
Theoretical
Constructs Empirical Measures Acronym Source Level
Price Cost of living adj.weighted cavgfees PCCS Center
Avg. hourly fee charged by ctrs
Child-staff Teacher, asst. teacher Ch_tchr PCCS Center
ratio and child ratio
(center level)
Teacher, asst. teacher Ch_tchrg PCCS Center
and child ratio (group
level)
(table continues)
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Explanatory Variables
Theoretical
Constructs Empirical Measures Acronym Source Level
Community
Characteristics % movers from different Migrant 1990 Census of Pop. County
State & Housing
Serious crimes per 100,000 Crime U.S. Bureau of County
Resident Population, 1991 Investigation
Travel time to work (in min.) Travel 1990 Census of Pop. County
& Housing
Civilian unemployed as a Unemp U.S. Bureau of County
percent of total civilian Labor Statistics
Labor force, 1991
Direct General Expenditure Pergenex 1982 & 1987 Census County
Per capita (Based on 1990 of Government.
population)
Persons per household Hhsize 1990 Census of Pop. County
& Housing
Female civilian labor Female 1990 Census of Pop. County
force as a % of civilian & Housing.
females 16 years or over.
Percent White population Perwhite 1990 Pop. Census Zipcode
(table continues)
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Theoretical
Constructs Empirical Measures Acronym Source Level
Percent Black population PerBlack 1990 Pop Census Zipcode
Percent American Indians PerAmind 1990 Pop Census Zipcode
Percent Asians, Pacific Is PerAsian 1990 Pop Census Zipcode
Percent Hispanics Perhisp 1990 Pop Census Zipcode
Suppressed Other
% in preschool (pvt & public) preschpr 1990 Pop Census Zipcode
Family % of children < 1 year Chld0per 1990 Pop Census Zipcode
Characteristics % of children 1-2 years Chld 1 per 1990 Pop Census Zipcode.
% of children 3-4 years Chld3per 1990 Pop Census Zipcode.
% of children 5 years Chld5per 1990 Pop Census Zipcode.
% of children 0-5 yrs Chld05pr 1990 Pop Census Zipcode
% 65 years & older Oldagepr 1990 Pop Census Zipcode.
Cost of living adj. Median
Family Income cmedinc 1990 Pop Census Zipcode
Cost of living adj. Median
Family Income squared cmedinc2 1990 Pop Census Zipcode
% Female householder Femper 1990 Pop Census Zipcode
% BA Degree or higher BADegree 1990 Pop Census Zipcode
% No High School NoHighpr 1990 Pop Census Zipcode
% receiving Public Assist PerPublc 1990 Pop Census Zipcode
% families below poverty Povper 1990 Pop Census Zipcode
(table continues)
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Theoretical
Constructs Empirical Measures Acronym Source Level
Regulations
Inverse Max grp size 0-12mo(cen) ingpsizl Morgan, 1990 stat/loc
Inverse Max grp size 13-24mo(cen) ingpsiz2 Morgan, 1990 stat/loc
Inverse Max grp size25-36mo(cen) ingpsiz3 Morgan, 1990 stat/loc
Inverse Max grp size 37-4yr(cen) ingpsiz4 Morgan, 1990 stat/loc
Inverse Max grp size 5-12 yr (cen) ingpsizl2 Morgan, 1990 stat/loc
Max ch/staff ratio 0-12mo(cen) chstfl Morgan, 1990 stat/loc
Max ch/staff ratio 13-24 mo(cen) chstf2 Morgan, 1990 stat/loc
Max ch/staff ratio 25-36 mo(cen) chstf3 Morgan, 1990 stat/loc
Max ch/staff ratio 37-4 yr (cen) chstf4 Morgan, 1990 stat/loc
Number of mandated inspections visit GAO. 1992 stat/loc
Cost of Inputs cost of liv adj. median cmedhour PCCS PSU
hrly wage of teachers in 1989-90
cost of liv adj. median contract cmedrent 1990 census of housing PSU
rent per room in 1989.
(table continues)
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Theoretical
Constructs Empirical Measures Acronym Source Level
Provider A binary=l if sponsored by
Characteristics Head Start Head PCCS Center
A binary=l if sponsored by
public school Pubsch PCCS Center
A binary=l if sponsored by
religious group or church Religous PCCS Center
A binary=1 if center is
nonprofit Nonproft PCCS Center
A binary=I if center is
forprofit Forproft PCCS Center
Months the center is in
operation Mthsopn PCCS Center
If center is located in Il, MI,
NE, MN, OH & WI Ncentral PCCS Center
If center is located in AL,FL
GA,KY,LA,NC,SC,TN,TX South PCCS Center
If center is located in CT,
MN,MD,NY,MA,NH,NJ,
PA,RI Neast PCCS Center
(table continues)
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Theoretical
Constructs Empirical Measures Acronym Source Level
If center is located in AZ,
CA, CO, HI, ID,NM, OR,
WA, WY West PCCS Center
If center is located in
the largest 20 counties MSA PCCS Center
If center is located in
a non metropolitan area Rural PCCS Center
If center is located in
a city whose population
is over 100,000 Cencity PCCS Center
(Suppressed category=
Other)
Subsidy Cost-adj. JOBS childcare$,1990
Per child 3-13 yrs in poverty CJOBSper Ways & Means,1991 State
Cost-adj. Headstart $, 1990 per
Child 3-5 yrs in poverty CHeadper Consol. Fed. Funds PSU
Report, 1990
(table continues)
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Theoretical
Constructs Empirical Measures Acronym Source Level
Cost-adj. Pre-K $,1990 per cPreK Mitchel,Seligson, State
child 3-4 yrs in poverty & Marx, 1989;
Adams, 1994
Cost-adj. Title XX $,1990 cSSBG Adams, 1992 State
per child 0-13 in poverty
(child care expenditure)
Cost-adj. State subsidized CStatsub Adams, 1992 State
child care per eligible
family/child 1990.
Cost-adj. Max deduction Cmaxamt Steinschneider,J State
for childcare for a max of 1994
2 dependents in
tax year 1993.
A binary-l if the psu had a R_R Child Care Research
R&R in 1990. Partnership, 1996 PSU
A binary=l if the state has
Child and Dependent Care CADCProv Steinschneider,J State
Provision inTax Credit in 1994
tax year 1993.
(table continues)
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Theoretical
Constructs Empirical Measures Acronym Source Level
A binary=l if the State Refund Steinschneider,J State
Child Care Dependent 1994
Credit is refundable
in tax year 1993.
Cost of living, 1991 Costliv Cost of living index
Second Quarter,
Vol 24, No 2.
Produced by ACCRA.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Median Standard Coeff. Skewness
Deviation Variation
Dependent
Variables
cavgfees 1467 1.49 1.35 0.82 0.55 2.07
Ch_tchr 1808 10.68 9.00 6.63 0.62 2.28
Ch_tchrg 1939 8.47 8.13 3.40 0.40 1.40
Explanatory
Variables
Community
Characteristics
Migrant 2088 0.10 0.08 5.70 57.00 1.29
Crime 2088 6059 5959 2722 0.45 0.32
Travel 2088 21.80 21.40 3.76 0.17 0.08
Unemp 2088 0.07 0.07 2.12 30.29 0.58
Hhsize 2088 2.59 2.59 0.19 0.07 -0.56
Female 2088 0.58 0.58 5.73 9.88 -0.22
Perwhite 2046 0.76 0.88 0.27 0.36 -1.33
PerBlack 2046 0.17 0.04 0.26 1.53 1.77
PerAmind 2046 0.01 0.00 0.03 3.86 18.60
PerAsian 2046 0.03 0.01 0.09 3.00 6.14
Perhisp 2046 0.08 0.02 0.14 1.84 3.17
(table continues)
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Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Median Standard Coeff. Skewness
Deviation Variation
Preschpr 2045 0.21 0.21 0.07 0.35 0.53
ChldOper 2045 0.15 0.15 0.04 0.27 0.84
Chld1per 2045 0.36 0.36 0.04 0.11 -0.25
Chld3per 2045 0.33 0.33 0.04 0.12 0.96
ChldSper 2045 0.16 0.16 0.03 0.19 0.29
Chld05per 2046 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.22 0.53
Oldagepr 2046 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.38 0.58
cmedinc 2046 34752 32595 12596 0.36 1.45
Femper 2045 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.71 1.60
BADegree 2046 0.21 0.18 0.14 0.67 1.18
NoHighpr 2046 0.25 0.23 0.13 0.52 0.67
PerPubic 2045 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.88 2.35
Povper 2045 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.91 1.93
Pergenex 2089 1858 1523 2008 1.08 5.7
Regulations
ingpsiz1 2088 0.10 0.07 0.11 1.10 0.91
ingpsiz2 2088 0.05 0.05 0.05 1.00 0.33
ingpsiz3 2037 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.75 0.82
ingpsiz4 2088 0.02 0.03 0.02 1.00 -0.01
chstf1 2088 4.70 4.00 1.41 0.30 1.29
(table continues)
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Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Median Standard Coeff. Skewness
Deviation Variation
chstf2 2088 5.97 6.00 1.88 0.31 0.80
chstf3 2088 10.15 10.00 2.68 0.26 0.33
chstf4 2088 13.63 12.00 3.81 0.28 0.43
visit 2088 1.48 1.00 1.02 0.69 1.44
Cost of Inputs
cmedhour 2088 7.40 6.70 2.61 0.35 1.83
cmedrent 2088 72.00 66.88 29.09 0.40 0.78
Provider
Characteristics
head 1972 0.12 0.00 0.32 2.67 2.36
pubsch 1972 0.21 0.00 0.41 1.95 1.42
religous 1972 0.12 0.00 0.33 2.75 2.31
forproft 1971 0.28 0.00 0.45 1.61 0.98
Mthsopn 1772 132.20 96.00 131.69 1.00 3.25
Numfees 1186 3.16 3.00 1.88 0.59 1.09
Ncentral 2088 0.23 0.00 0.42 1.83 1.27
south 2088 0.35 0.00 0.48 1.37 0.63
Neast 2088 0.20 0.00 0.40 2.00 1.46
west 2088 0.21 0.00 0.41 1.95 1.39
msa 2088 0.17 0.00 0.37 2.18 1.78
(table continues)
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Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Median Standard Coeff. Skewness
Deviation Variation
Rural 2088 0.21 0.00 0.41 1.95 1.41
Cencity 2088 0.28 0.00 0.45 1.61 0.99
Subsidy
cPreK 2088 388.68 193.58 656.86 1.69 4.29
cSSBG 2088 25.27 0.00 38.63 1.53 1.49
CStatsub 2088 97.24 40.51 150.98 1.55 2.38
CJOBSper 2088 15.03 6.02 19.23 1.28 1.48
CHeadper 2088 1524 531 5732 3.76 6.40
Cmaxamt 2088 227 0.00 347 1.53 2.16
R_R 2088 0.81 1.00 0.39 0.48 -1.59
CADCProv 2088 0.48 0.00 0.50 1.04 0.09
Refund 2088 0.06 0.00 0.23 3.83 3.77
Incomtax 2088 0.86 1.00 0.35 0.41 -2.09
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Functional Form And Statistical Analysis
Functional Form
In child care literature the most common functional form for cost and quality is
linear with the exception of family income which is curvilinear. Family income is entered
in a curvilinear form to allow for nonlinearities. The variable family income was included
in a linear as well as squared term and the other variables were entered in the linear term.
This dissertation seeks to explore correct functional form for equations explaining
child/staff and price of care.
It is crucial to have the model correctly specified so as to draw accurate
conclusions from it. Economic theory, investigator's own perception about the theory and
previous literature provide the initial formulation of econometric models. The researcher
comes up with different models and puts them through a number of diagnostic tests and
selects the most appropriate one.
One method of model selection is the general to simple model advocated by
Hendry (1985) [see also Hendry and Richards (1982,1983)]. In the model selection
process advocated by Hendry, which is also called "top-down" approach, the investigator
starts with a general dynamic model and by using Wald and t-tests attempts to make the
model more parsimonious. The advantages of such a parsimonious model are more
degrees of freedom, greater power of test and a simpler model (Ramanathan, 1995).
This dissertation will use the general to simple method of model selection.
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Statistical Analysis - Hendry's General to Simple Model
First the model was estimated for each of the three reduced form equations, by
using multiple regression. The plot of residuals was checked for violations of the
assumptions of OLS. The plot of residuals were heteroskedastic. All variables with It-
ratiosl<1 were dropped (Huber, 1967 # 1 as cited in Queralt and Witte, Working Paper
Series, 1996). Next the Wald test (Greene, 1993) was performed to see if the dropped
variables were jointly as well as individually insignificant. The final linear specification
consists of only variables which have It-ratios <1.The resulting final linear specification
model that emerged for the three equations is given in Tables 4, 5 and 6.
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Table 4
Final Linear Specification Child Staff Ratio (Group Level)
Variable Coeff. Std.Err t-value p-value
Dependent
Chtchrg
Independent
Regulations
chstfl -0.091 0.066 -1.391 0.165
ingpsiz2 9.624 3.718 2.588 0.010
ingpsiz3 -5.970 4.443 -1.344 0.179
Community
Characteristics
unemp 0.079 0.042 1.856 0.064
preschpr 3.374 1.469 2.297 0.022
Family
Characteristics
chldlper 4.082 1.903 2.145 0.032
cmedinc -0.000 8.760 -2.004 0.045
Provider
Characteristics
head 0.521 0.273 1.907 0.057
religous 0.349 0.266 1.314 0.184
pubsch 0.419 0.228 1.840 0.066
forproft 0.324 0.207 1.562 0.119
Neast -0.972 0.226 -4.296 0.000
Rural -0.816 0.253 -3.227 0.001
cencity -0.432 0.212 -2.041 0.041
msa -0.263 0.257 -1.022 0.307
(table continues)
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Variable Coeff. Std.Err t-value p-value
Cost of Inputs
cmedrent 0.008 0.004 1.931 0.054
Subsidy
CStatsub -0.002 0.001 -3.522 0.000
CHeadper -0.000 0.000 -2.139 0.033
R_R -0.360 0.245 -1.470 0.142
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Table 5
Final Linear Specification Child Staff Ratio (Center Level)
Variable Coeff. Std.Err t-value p-value
Dependent
Ch_ctr
Independent
Regulation
chstf2 0.205 0.134 1.535 0.125
chstf4 -0.134 0.068 -1.952 0.051
ingpsiz1 -9.164 2.922 -3.136 0.002
ingpsiz2 19.750 8.305 2.378 0.018
ingpsiz3 10.711 8.856 1.210 0.227
Community
Characteristics
Perwhite 3.762 1.624 2.317 0.021
PerBlack 2.180 1.638 1.331 0.184
Female -0.123 0.034 -3.579 0.000
Family
Characteristics
Oldagepr -5.539 3.644 -1.520 0.129
Provider
Characteristics
mthsopn 0.002 0.001 1.603 0.109
south -2.938 0.636 -4.622 0.000
Neast -3.347 0.540 -6.200 0.000
west -3.239 0.593 -5.461 0.000
rural -1.296 0.499 -2.597 0.009
Cost of Inputs
cmedhour 0.284 0.078 3.657 0.000
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Table 6
Final Linear Specification Center Average Hourly Fee
Variable Coeff. Std.Err t-value p-value
Dependent
Cavgfees
Independent
Regulation
chstf1 0.092 0.026 3.573 0.000
chstf3 0.088 0.026 3.399 0.001
chstf4 -0.048 0.015 -3.297 0.001
chstf2 -0.087 0.026 -3.328 0.001
ingpsiz3 2.496 1.146 2.177 0.030
ingpsiz4 2.612 1.608 1.624 0.105
visit -0.042 0.027 -1.574 0.116
Community
Characteristics
migrant 0.012 0.005 2.338 0.020
crime -0.000 0.000 -1.788 0.074
preschpr -1.247 0.425 -2.938 0.003
Pergenex 0.000 0.000 -3.864 0.000
Family
Characteristics
Femalper 0.739 0.275 2.688 0.007
cmedinc 0.000 8.520 2.547 0.011
cmedinc2 -1.050 7.420 -1.414 0.158
Provider
Characteristics
mthsopn 0.000 0.000 3.981 0.000
head 0.148 0.073 2.034 0.042
south -0.341 0.119 -2.853 0.004
Neast -0.200 0.110 -1.819 0.069
(table continues)
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Variable Coeff. Std.Err t-value p-value
west -0.304 0.106 -2.866 0.004
cencity 0.163 0.083 1.970 0.049
msa 0.154 0.092 1.677 0.094
Cost of Inputs
cmedrent 0.006 0.001 4.396 0.000
Subsidy
cPreK -0.000 0.000 -3.920 0.000
cSSBG 0.004 0.001 3.892 0.000
CStatsub 0.000 0.000 1.641 0.101
CJOBSper 0.004 0.002 1.816 0.070
R_R 0.164 0.080 2.052 0.007
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Next the possibility of nonlinearities in the explanatory variables in the Final
Linear Specification was examined. For this procedure, the variables from each of the
Final Linear Specification in their linear terms, all continuous variables in their squared
terms and all possible interactions among the variables were regressed on each of the
dependent variables. For example, for the child/staff ratio at the group level, from the
final linear specification for the child/staff (group) equation the explanatory variables in
their linear term, the continuous variables in their squared terms and all possible
interactions among the explanatory variables were regressed on the dependent variable
which is the child/staff ratio at the group level.
The nonlinear equation that emerged for the child/staff at the group level was:
Chtchrg = P0 +P1 xi 1 + f2Xi2+ P3x 12+ PA4xi 2 + 5 XilXi2+
where Ch tchrg is the child/staff ratio at the group level. Xii, Xi2,....Xin are
continuous independent variables in their linear terms, Xi1 2, Xi22 are the squared terms
and Xi X 2 are interaction terms and E is the error term.
Highly correlated variables were then dropped. Then to reduce the specifications,
all variables with It-ratios <1 were dropped. The dropped variables were then jointly as
well as individually tested for significance using Wald test. This procedure was repeated
until all variables with t-ratiosl<l had been dropped.
For the average fees equation the procedure followed was slightly different. First
a stepwise regression procedure was used to choose those variables which were
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significant. This was necessary because the non linear specification for the fees equation
was too large.Then the variables with jt-ratios<1 were dropped and the dropped variables
were then tested jointly as well as individually for significance using Wald test.
This became Hendry's general to simple model. Tables 7, 8 and 9 give the significant
variables for the general to simple method.
To explain the coefficient of the squared and the interaction terms we have to
calculate the partial derivative and the elasticities. The partial derivative which is
calculated at the median values of the explanatory variable shows the effect
of a unit change in the explanatory variable, on the dependent variable. The
elasticities denote the percent change that could occur in the dependent variable
for one percent change in the explanatory variable.The effects implied by this
specification are summarized in Tables 10, 11 and 12 (Empirical Results).
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Table 7
Significant General to Simple --Group
Variable Linear Square Interaction Coeff. p-value
Coeff. Coeff. with
Cost of Inputs
cmedrent -0.0165
(0.047)
Subsidy
CStatsub 0.0031 ingpsiz3 -0.0868 0.014
(0.161)
RR Neast -0.7970 0.002
ingpsiz2 8.6690 0.002
Community
Characteristics
Preschpr 33.7050 Religous 11.1158 0.007
(0.000) ingpsiz3 -94.6849 0.021
cmedrent 0.0772 0.032
cmedinc -0.0004 0.000
Unemp chstfl 0.1503 0.216
pubsch 0.1960 0.037
Regulations
ingpsiz3 56.9565
(0.230)
chstfl head -0.1478 0.220
(table continues)
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Variable Linear Square Interaction Coeff. p-value
Coeff. Coeff. with
Provider
Characteristics
pubsch -3.9148 rural -1.7229 0.000
(0.014) cencity 
-1.0101 0.010
head cmedinc 0.0000 0.021
religous rural -2.0311 0.004
cmedinc -0.0000 0.043
CHeadper 0.0000 0.273
Forproft rural -0.8785 0.022
Family
Characteristics
Chldiper pubsch 9.9528 0.007
forproft 1.6881 0.005
cmedinc 9.0300 ingpsiz3 0.0005 0.023
(0.012)
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TABLE 8
Significant General to Simple - Child Staff Ratio
Variable Linear Square Interaction Coeff. p-value
Coeff. Coeff. with
Regulations
Chstf4 rural -0.1896 0.030
cmedhour 0.0213 0.000
chstf2 -0.0204 0.007
Ingpsiz3 171.0955
(0.003)
Rural ingpsiz1 -29.3883 0.000
ingpsiz2 56.0912 0.003
Community
Characteristics
Perwhite south -13.8396 0.000
Neast 1.7656 0.287
chstf2 0.5347 0.001
PerBlack south -9.9438 0.002
Female -0.0027 Oldagepr 0.7467 0.207
(0.000) south 0.1548 0.002
Oldagepr -41.42744 west -22.2108 0.000
(0.227)
Cost of Inputs
cmedhour ingpsizl -0.4141 0.162
Provider
Characteristics
Neast -4.9076 rural -2.1655 0.201
(0.001)
mthsopn -6.5700 rural 0.0084 0.020
(.001) ingpsiz2 0.0874 0.000
south rural 2.2148 0.147
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TABLE 9
Significant General to Simple- Average Fees
Variable Linear Square Interaction Coeff. p-value
Coeff. Coeff. with
Regulations
Ingpsiz3 14.1479 cmedrent -0.1302 0.001
(0.000) cPreK -0.0144 0.000
cSSBG -0.1246 0.000
Chstfl Femalper -0.2898 0.080
preschpr -0.5166 0.008
Mthsopn 0.0004 0.008
cmedrent 0.0035 0.000
Chstf2 R_R -0.0675 0.000
Chstf3 Femalper 0.1333 0.056
mthsopn 0.0004 0.000
Chstf4 mthsopn -0.0002 0.008
south -0.1285 0.000
visit cmedrent -0.0049 0.000
Community
Characteristics
Preschpr 4.0572 CJOBSper -0.0285 0.016
(0.005) mthsopn -0.0069 0.005
visit 1.1865 0.000
cmedrent -0.0375 0.000
Pergenex 0.0003 0.021
CStatsub 0.0087 0.000
Femalper 2.1127 south -0.5403 0.235
(0.001) preschpr -7.1634 0.002
head -0.9635 0.005
msa -1.1103 0.018
cPreK 0.0005 0.014
Provider
Characteristics
head cPreK 0.0004 0.001
cSSBG 0.0030 0.048
ingpsiz4 5.6663 0.041
(table continues)
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Variable Linear Square Interaction Coeff. P-value
Coeff. Coeff with
Cencity Pergenex 0.0004 0.000
cSSBG -0.0028 0.092
mthsopn-0.0039 south -0.0016 0.001
(.001) cmedrent 0.0000 0.000
Pergenex -4.3900 0.000
cPreK -3.4000 0.006
cSSBG 8.7300 0.046
CJOBSper 0.0000 0.042
ingpsiz4 0.0380 0.000
south 1.9033
(0.000)
west 1.6450 Pergenex -0.0012 0.000
(0.000)
msa 0.1997 CJOBSper 0.0128 0.016
(0.147)
Subsidy
cSSBG South -0.0065 0.004
msa -0.0051 0.024
R_R 0.0113 0.000
cencity -0.0028 0.092
cPreK 6.5300 CJOBSper 0.0000 0.054
(0.000) CStatsub -3.3500 0.002
R_R cmedrent 0.0063 0.025
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Table 10
Nonlinear Specification-- Child/Staff Ratio (Group)
Variable Effect on Child/Staff Elasticity
Ratio (Group)
(Partial Derivatives)
Family
Characteristics
cmedinc -0.000014 -0.05604
Community
Characteristics
preschpr 1.061066 0.027408
Unemp 0.054123 0.000466
Cost of Inputs
cmedrent 0.016206 0.133318
Subsidy
CStatsub -0.00039 -0.00193
R R 0.43345 0.053315
Provider
Characteristics
Religious -1.60207
Head 0.742094
Regulations
Ingpsiz3 -2.24131 -0.01103
Note. Elasticities are calculated at the median values.
64
Table 11
Nonlinear Specification--Child/Staff Ratio (Center)
Variable Effect on Child/Staff Elasticity
Ratio (Center)
(Partial Derivatives)
Family
Characteristics
Oldagepr 1.883039 0.027199
Community
Characteristics
Female -0.21637 -1.39437
Perwhite 3.208047 0.313676
Provider
Characteristics
Rural -0.72134
Mthsopn 0.00311 0.033174
Regulations
Ingpsiz3 13.68764 0.060834
Ingpsiz2 8.393261 0.046629
Ingpsizl -2.77446 -0.02158
chstf4 0.020434 0.027245
chstf2 0.226262 0.150841
Note. Elasticities are calculated at the median values.
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Table 12
Nonlinear Specification-- Average Fees
Variable Effect on Average Fees Elasticity
(Partial Derivatives)
Family
Characteristics
Femalper -0.50884 -0.06
Community
Characteristics
preschpr -1.57799 -0.25
Cost of Inputs
cmedrent 0.005772 0.29
Subsidy
cSSBG 0.007112 0.57
cPreK -0.00036 -0.05
CStatsub 0.00118 0.04
CJOBSper -0.00113 -0.01
R_R -0.20 -0.15
Provider
Characteristics
Mthsopn 0.0009585 0.000019
Head 0.08
(table continues)
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Variable Effect on Average Fees Elasticity
(Partial Derivatives)
Regulations
Visit -0.081577 -0.06
Ingpsiz4 3.645552 0.08
Ingpsiz3 2.657099 0.08
Chstf4 -0.02 -0.15
Chstf3 0.06 0.44
Chstf2 -0.0675 -0.30
Chstfl 0.12 0.35
Note. Elasticities are calculated at the median values except for cSSBG which is
calculated at the 75th Percentile.
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CHAPTER SIX
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Interaction Effects
Significant Exolanatory Variable Effects on Child/Staff Ratio at the Group Level
In this model the dependent variable is the child/staff ratio at the group level in
the center. Table 10 gives the empirical interaction results of significant explanatory
variable effects on the child/staff ratio at the group level.
Cost of living adjusted state subsidy per child in poverty 3 -13 years (Figure 1)
The negative partial derivative means that for a unit increase in cost of living adjusted
state subsidized care per child in poverty, there is a unit decrease in the child/staff ratio at
the group level. The elasticity of a negative 0.002 means that for one percent increase in
the State subsidy per child in poverty, there is a 0.002% decrease in the child /staff ratio
at the group level.
The state subsidy graph (Figure 1) shows a negatively decelerating curve, which
indicates that for every one unit increase in the state subsidy per poor child there is a unit
decrease in the staff/child ratio. For example if the state subsidy increases from $100 per
poor child to $200 per poor child , the staff/child ratio at the group level decreases from
18.13 to 18.09. It is possible that as more subsidies become available to the centers, they
increase the number of staff per child. This finding confirms previous studies that low-
income children receive better quality of care (National Child Care Staffing Study, 1989).
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It is also worth noting that the interaction between state subsidy and inverse
maximum group size for 25-36 months is also significant (p value of 0.014), as given in
Table 7. Figure 2 shows the interaction between cost adjusted state subsidy per child in
poverty and inverse maximum group size for 25-36 months, when the regulation is
stringent, lax ( the most lax is the mean) and at the median level. When the maximum
group size is stringent for a given level of subsidies, the child/staff ratio decreases rapidly.
At the median level the decrease is less rapid and when the regulation is lax, the curve
actually rises at a very slow rate. We can conclude that state subsidy seems to be most
effective when the maximum group size regulation is most stringent.
Inverse maximum group size ( 25 - 36 months) and center regulations (Figure 3)
Figure 3 indicates that as the maximum group size increases (lower the inverse) the
center child ratio at the group level increases. The elasticity of -0.01 indicates that for
every 1% increase in the inverse of the maximum group size permitted in centers, there
is a corresponding decrease of 0.010% in the child/staff ratios at the group level at such
centers.
The curve is a positively accelerating curve. The curve accelerates at a faster rate
when the maximum group size is very stringent (between 5 and 10) when compared to a
less stringent maximum group size. As these regulations become more stringent the
centers decrease the number of children per staff. This is an example of spillover effects
of center regulations.
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Resource and referral a2encv and center location in the north east (Figure 4)
If the community where the center is located has a Resource and Referral (RR) agency
and the center is located in the North East, then the mean value of the child/staff ratio for
the group is a low 7.72 when compared to 8.63 when there is no RR agency and the
center is not located in the North East (Figure 4). When there is no R_R agency and when
the center is located in the North East the mean value of the child/staff ratio is 7.82.
When there is an RR agency and the center is not located in the North East the mean
value of the child/staff ratio is 8.68. The interaction of R_R and North East is significant.
The interaction between R_R and inverse of maximum group size (13-24 months) is also
significant. See Table 7.
Public school sponsor and center location in the rural area (Figure 5)
If the center is public school sponsored and located in the rural area, mean value of
the child/staff ratio at the group level is significantly low at 8.31 (Figure 5).
When a center is not public school sponsored and not located in the rural area the
mean value of child/staff ratio is 8.47. When the center is not public school sponsored
and located in a rural area the mean value of the child/staff ratio is 8.17 and when the
center is public school sponsored and not located in a rural area the mean child/staff ratio
is 8.84.The interaction of public school sponser and location in the rural area is
significant. See Table 7.
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Church sponsor and center location in the rural area (Figure 6)
If the center is church sponsored and located in the rural area, the mean value of the
child/staff ratio at the group level is a low 7.08. When a center is not church sponsored
and not located in the rural area the mean child/staff ratio is 8.52. When the center is
not church sponsored but located in a rural area the mean child/staff ratio is 8.73.
When the center is church sponsored and not located in a rural area the ratio is 8.30.
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Public School sponsor and center location in a central city (Figure 7)
If the center is public school sponsored and located in central city the mean value of the
child/staff ratio is significantly low at 8.10 . When a center is sponsored by a public
school and not located in the central city the mean value of the child/staff ratio is 8.97.
When a center is not sponsored by a public school and not located in the central city the
mean value of the child/staff ratio is 8.41.
Resource and Referral Agency and Inverse of maximum group size (13-24
months) (Figure 8)
When we compare the effect of presence of Resource and Referral (RR) agencies in the
center PSU area, we can draw some interesting conclusions. The child/staff ratio is
always higher for centers with R_R when compared to centers which no R_R agencies.
This finding reveals that resource and referral agencies play a significant role as providers
of consumer information. Parents being concerned about quality in child care centers may
find the presence of R_R agencies reassuring. The interaction of R_R and inverse
maximum group size for 13-24 months is also significant. See Table 7.
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Significant Explanatory Variable Effects on Child/Staff Ratio at the Center Level
In this specification, the dependent variable is the Child Staff Ratio at the center
level. Table 11 summarizes its interaction effects.
Effect of Center Maximum Child Staff Ratio Regulation ( 37 months to 4 years)
on Child Staff Ratio at the center level (Figure 9)
The positive partial derivative of 0.02, suggests that for every one unit increase in the
maximum child staff regulation for children between the ages of 37-60 months, there
is a unit increase in the center child staff ratio. The elasticity of 0.03% indicates that
if the maximum child staff regulation increases by 30%, for example from 10 children per
staff to 13 children per staff, the corresponding increase in the child staff ratio for the
center is 1%.
The curve as shown in the graph is a linearly accelerating curve which means that
for every unit increase in the maximum child staff ratio regulation, there is an increase in
the child staff ratio. The explanation for this behavior seems logical. As the regulation is
relaxed, the centers increase the child staff ratio to obviously conserve financial
resources. The interaction of maximum child staff regulation for ages 37-60 months,
with center location in a rural area and with maximum child staff regulation for ages
13-24 months are significant. See Table 8.
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Effect of Inverse Maximum Group Size (25-36 months) on Center Child Staff Ratio
(Figure 10)
The positive partial derivative of 13.69, indicates that for every one unit increase
in the inverse maximum group size regulation (as the maximum group size decreases),
the center child staff ratio increases. The elasticity of 0.06 indicates that for every 1%
increase in the inverse of the maximum group size permitted in centers, there is a
corresponding increase of 0.06% in the child/staff ratios at such centers. If the maximum
group size decreases from 10 (an inverse of 0.1) to 6.67 (an inverse of 0.15), the
child/staff ratio increases from 11.86 to 12.21.
The curve is a negatively decelerating curve. The curve decelerates at faster rate
when the maximum group size is very stringent (between 5 and 10) when compared to a
less stringent maximum group size. As the regulations become more stringent the centers
increase the number of children per staff.
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Effect of center group size regulation 0-12 months on child staff ratio (Figure 11)
The negative partial derivative of -2.77, indicates that for every one unit increase
in the inverse maximum group size regulation ( the maximum group size decreases),
the center child staff ratio increases. The curve is positively accelerative curve.
The curve accelerates at a faster rate when the maximum group size is very stringent
(between 5 and 10) when compared to a less stringent maximum group size. As the
regulations become more stringent the centers decrease the number of children per staff.
Interaction of center group size regulation 0-12 months and location in a rural
area (Figure 12)
The interaction of maximum center group size regulation 0-12 months and location
in a rural area is significant. See Table 8. When the center is located in a rural area
the child/staff ratio is significantly lower (Figure 12). Another major finding is that
location in a rural area has a significantly lower child/staff ratio (Table 11).
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Significant Explanatory Variable Effects on Average Fees at the Center Level
The dependent variable is the weighted average fees for each center. Table 12
summarizes the interaction effects.
Effect of Inverse Maximum Group Size (37-60) months on the Center hourly fee
(Figure 13)
The positive partial derivative of 3.65 indicates that for every one unit increase in the
inverse maximum group size regulation (maximum group size decreases), the average
hourly fee increases. The elasticity of 0.08 indicates that for every 1% increase in the
inverse maximum group size regulation, the increase in the average hourly fee is 0.08%.
The curve as shown in Figure 13 is a negatively decelerating curve. The curve decelerates
at faster rate when the maximum group size is very stringent (between 5 and 10) when
compared to a less stringent maximum group size. As the regulations become more
stringent the hourly fee increases. To keep costs down, centers increase the price of care
when regulations become stringent.
If the maximum group size decreases from 10 (an inverse of 0.1) to 6.67 (an
inverse of 0.15), the hourly fee increases from $6.58 to $ 6.76.
Effect of Maximum Child Staff Ratio Regulation (0-12 months) (Figure 14):
The partial derivative is 0.12 and elasticity is 0.35. When the maximum child staff ratio
increases by 1% the hourly fee increases by 0.35%.This is surprising. The curve is
positively accelerating. When the maximum Child Staff ratio is 4 the average hourly fee
is $6.95 and when the maximum child staff ratio is 10 the average hourly fee is $7.67.
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As summarized in Table 12, when the maximum child staff ratio for ages 25-36 months
becomes more stringent the hourly price increases. Whereas for maximum child staff
ratio for ages 13-24 months and 37-60 months the findings are opposite. When these
regulations become stringent, the hourly price increases.
Interaction of Resource and Referral Agencies and Maximum Child Staff Ratios
for ages 13-24 Months (Figure 15)
Figure 15 reveals that when a resource and referral agency is present in the center PSU
area, the average hourly fee is significantly lower. This finding seems reasonable give the
previous findings that child/staff ratio at the group level in centers with a resource and
referral agency present is higher.
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Effect of prekindergarten Funds on Center Hourly Fee (Figure 16)
The negative partial derivative means that for a unit increase in prekindergarten funds per
child in poverty, the center hourly fee decreases. The elasticity of a negative 0.05 means
that for one percent increase in the prekindergarten funds per poor child, there is a
0.05% decrease in the center hourly fee. Figure 16 shows the interaction of cost adjusted
prekindergarten funds and maximum group size regulation for ages 25-36 months.
When the maximum group size regulation for ages 25-36 months is most stringent
for a given level of cost adjusted prekindergarten funds, the decrease in the center
hourly price is most steep.
Effect of Cost Adjusted Social Services Block Grant on Center Hourly Fee
(Figure 17)
The positive partial derivative of 0.007 means that for a unit increase in the
social services block grant per child in poverty, the center hourly fee increases.
But the interaction of cost adjusted social services block grant and maximum group
size regulation for ages 25-36 months is interesting. When the regulation is most
stringent there is a steep decrease in the center hourly price of care. One of
the major findings of this dissertation is the interaction of regulations and subsidy
variables.
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94
7.5 Mean value;Max. Group Size33
7
U- 65 Median value
Max. Group Size=25
6
E 5.5 Most stringent;o Max. Group Size=6
5
20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Cost. adj. SSBG subsidy per child ($)
Figure 17. Interaction of cost adjusted (adj.) social services block grant (SSBG)
subsidy and maximum group size regulation for ages 25-36 months on
center hourly fee
95
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Subsidies Among subsidies, only the state subsidy has a significant effect on the
child/staff ratio at the group level. As the amount of state subsidy per poor child
increases the child/staff ratio decreases. We can conclude that subsidies have a desirable
effect on quality of care. It is interesting to note that only state subsidies have a significant
effect on quality. It is also worth noting the interaction between regulatory and subsidy
variables. When the regulatory variables are very stringent the effect on quality of care
is vigorous. The same finding also applies to the effect on price of care. When the
regulatory variables are most stringent the effect on price of care is most dramatic.
Regulations Maximum group size and maximum child staff ratio regulations have a
significant effect on quality and price of care. When the maximum center group size
regulation for 25-36 months becomes more stringent, the child/staff ratio at the group
level decreases. Another important finding is the interaction of presence of resource
and referral agencies in the center PSU area and the maximum group size regulations.
When the maximum group size regulation for ages 13-24 months becomes more
stringent and when a resource and referral agency is present, the child/staff ratio
increases at the group level. This reveals that resource and referral agencies are
doing their job as providers of consumer information effectively. Another major
finding is that if the center is located in a rural area the child/staff ratio is lower.
Maximum group size regulations have a negative effect on center hourly fee.
Maximum child/staff regulations have a mixed effect on center hourly price.
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Maximum child/staff regulations for age group 13-24 months and 37-60
months have a negative effect on price. Maximum child/staff regulations for age
group 0-12 months and 25-36 months have a positive effect on price. This is
surprising. Findings also indicate that the center average hourly price is lower when
there is a resource and referral agency present. Resource and referral agencies have a
desirable effect on price of care.
Center Sponsorship Another major finding is the interaction of geographic location
and nature of center sponsorship. The child/staff ratio at the group level is significantly
lower when there is such an interaction.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Findings suggest that among subsidies only the state subsidy has a significant
negative effect on the quality of care. As the amount of state subsidy per poor child
increases the child/staff ratio decreases. Subsidies have no significant effect on the price
of care except for prekindergarten and social services block grant. Prekindergarten funds
have a negative effect and social services block grant has a positive effect on price.
The finding about the significant interaction of regulations and subsidy variable provides
scope for future research. One reason may be that this dissertation does not differentiate
on the basis of age groups of children. Subsidies may significantly affect the price of care
of infants and toddlers, because of the high cost of care for these age groups.
Maximum group size and maximum child staff ratio have a significant effect
on quality and price of care. When the maximum group size regulations become
stringent, the child/staff ratio decreases. An interesting finding is that as the
regulation for maximum group size for age groups 13-24 months and 25-36 months
become stringent, the child/staff ratio for the center increases. This shows that
regulations have spillover effects. Maximum child/staff regulations have a mixed effect
on center hourly price. Maximum child/staff regulations for age group 13-24 months and
37-60 months have a negative effect on price. Maximum child/staff regulations for age
group 0-12 months and 25-36 months have a positive effect on price.
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The findings also suggest that the presence of an R&R agency has a significant
effect on the quality of care. The child staff ratio is higher when an R&R agency is
present. This reveals that R&R agencies provide information on the availability of child
care to parents.
Geographic location also plays a significant role in affecting the quality of care in
centers. The interaction of geographic location and sponsored centers is significant.
The child/staff ratio is significantly lower.
One of the major limitations of this study is that it does not differentiate on the
basis of age groups of children. For example, subsidies may significantly affect the price
of care of infants and toddlers, because of the high cost of care for these age groups.
Regulations of quality of care will also affect each age group differently. Future studies
differentiating on the basis of age groups of children will helpful.
Another limitation of this study is that since 1990, especially with the passing of
the new welfare law there have been major changes in the child care subsidies. The
number of subsidies have increased and researchers can devote their attention towards
finding out the effect of these new subsides on the price and quality of care.
In conclusion we can say that this dissertation has revealed some major findings
but with the passing of the new welfare law there is tremendous scope for additional
research.
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